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Article
Judgment, Identity, and Independence
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON
Whenever a new corporate or governmental scandal erupts, onlookers
ask, “Where were the lawyers?” Why would attorneys not have advised
their clients of the risks posed by conduct that, from an outsider’s
perspective, appears indefensible? When numerous red flags have gone
unheeded, people often conclude that the lawyers’ failure to sound the
alarm must be caused by greed, incompetence, or both. A few scholars
have suggested that unconscious cognitive bias may better explain such
lapses in judgment, but they have not explained why particular situations
are more likely than others to encourage such bias. This Article seeks to
fill that gap. Drawing on research from behavioral and social psychology,
it suggests that lawyers’ apparent lapses in judgment may be caused by
cognitive biases arising from partisan kinship between lawyer and client.
The Article uses identity theory to distinguish particular situations in
which attorney judgment is likely to be compromised, and it recommends
strategies to enhance attorney independence and minimize judgment
errors.
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Judgment, Identity, and Independence
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON*
I. INTRODUCTION: “WHERE WERE THE LAWYERS?”
Whenever corporate and governmental scandals erupt, onlookers are
quick to ask, “Where were the lawyers?”1 From the savings and loan
failures of the 1980s, through Enron’s collapse, Hewlett-Packard’s
pretexting operation,2 the repudiated interrogation memos from the Office
of Legal Counsel,3 and countless less-publicized mishaps and failures,
courts and commentators have questioned why on Earth the high-level
attorneys involved in each case did not steer their clients to safer legal
ground.
Onlookers often conclude that, because the detrimental legal
consequences of the clients’ decisions were so clear, the lawyers involved
must have been complicit in client wrongdoing. Professor Donald
Langevoort coined the term “venality hypothesis,” to describe this
phenomenon, and others have similarly adopted the phrase.4 The venality
hypothesis has been proffered as an explanation for nearly every legal
scandal, as people assume that the lawyers were greedy, willfully
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1
See, e.g., Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (“Where
were these professionals . . . when these clearly improper transactions were being consummated? . . .
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent involved . . . why at least one
professional would not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this case.”).
2
See Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 13 (2006) (including questions
from a Congress member: “[W]here were the lawyers? The red flags were waving all over the place,”
but “none of the lawyers stepped up to their responsibilities.”).
3
See infra Part IV.
4
Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’
Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 77–78 (1993) (“To pose the question of
attorney motivation is to invite a prompt answer from many people: greed and moral corruption, of
course. Lawyers know of their clients’ misdeeds, or at best deliberately close their eyes to the
evidence, simply to preserve their wealth, status and power.”). See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Banality
of Fraud: Resituating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 991 (2005).
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incompetent, or too weak to resist client pressure. Federal Judge William
G. Young clearly articulated the venality hypothesis in a recent pharmacy
antitrust case.6 After concluding that the defendants had clearly colluded
to inhibit competition, he asked, “Where were the lawyers here?”7 He
pointed out that the defendants included one of Massachusetts’s foremost
pharmacy chains and one of its leading HMOs and stated that “[s]urely
lawyers must have been in on this deal at its inception. Yet no fair-minded
lawyer . . . could have countenanced [the client’s action] and thought they
were doing aught but attempting an end run around the law.”8 He queried
whether there was “no lawyer on either side who cautioned against this
rather blatant attempt to frustrate the legislative will,” and concluded that
“[t]here should have been. The conduct of the lawyers who vetted this deal
was ‘too slick by half.’”9
The key assumption in the venality hypothesis—that because the legal
pitfalls of a decision are so obvious, a lawyer’s failure to caution against
the client’s action must amount to complicity or weakness in the face of
pressure—runs through other cases as well. One lawyer’s conduct in the
fall of the BCCI bank has been described as “almost forc[ing] the observer
who reviews the evidence in retrospect to conclude that he was either
stupid or venal,” and noting that “[h]is career up to this point rules out
stupidity.”10 In gentler terms, Jack Goldsmith, the former head of the
Office of Legal Counsel framed a similar argument about John Yoo, the
lawyer who drafted subsequently withdrawn memoranda defining torture
in detainee interrogation. Because Yoo possessed great “knowledge,
intelligence and energy” but nonetheless drafted “very important opinions”
of extremely “poor quality,” Goldsmith concluded that the errant legal
conclusions were likely due, in part, to the attorney’s succumbing to
“pressure from the White House”—and not merely to mistake or
incompetence.11
While this theme is common, it is not a universal explanation for
attorneys’ failure to warn of seemingly obvious legal pitfalls. Close
analysis of the events leading up to recent scandals fails to support the
narrative of professional misconduct. Yoo, for example, denied the
5
See Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the
Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 344 (2007) (“[E]very major financial scandal is attended
by cries of, ‘Where were the accountants? Where were the lawyers?’”).
6
J.E. Pierce Apothecary, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 119, 150 n.16
(D. Mass. 2005).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. (quoting Fed. Refinance Co. v. Klock, 229 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 n.2 (D. Mass. 2002), rev’d on
other grounds, 352 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2003)).
10
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 77–78.
11
Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 9, 2007, at 40.
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existence of White House pressure and vehemently defended his work on
the interrogation opinions.12 Many of Enron’s problems were later traced
to “a series of unconsciously biased judgments rather than a deliberate
program of criminality.”13 Of course, such defenses do not prove the
absence of wrongdoing, and this Article does not rule out conscious selfinterest as an explanation for many instances of bad legal advice. But in
those cases where there is no evidence of external pressure, greed, or
incompetence, it suggests that a more nuanced examination of attorney
judgment is necessary.
Inspired by work in the cognitive and behavioral sciences, a few
scholars are beginning to argue that “unconsciously biased judgments” are
at issue in recent scandals and to challenge the notion that such failure
necessarily results from either venality or stupidity.14 According to these
scholars, lawyers’ lapses in judgment—even severe lapses—may be
unconscious and innocent of venal motive, caused instead by cognitive
biases that lead to a “diminished capacity to perceive danger signals.”15
But innocent failures are by no means benign. Regardless of whether
bad legal advice is caused by innocent cognitive bias or by venal
wrongdoing, it results in the same costs and consequences to the client.
Furthermore, cognitive failures are even more difficult to recognize and
avoid than are conscious misdeeds,16 thus creating additional difficulties
for the client.
So far, the legal literature has not fully explored the factors that
promote such judgment-affecting cognitive bias. This Article seeks to
begin filling that gap. Drawing on identity theory from social psychology,
it develops an explanatory hypothesis for why certain situations may
prompt lawyers to deviate from a neutral perspective more often than
others and how that lack of neutrality prevents the lawyers from offering
fully independent advice to their clients. It focuses on situations in which
there is no direct financial incentive or other external incentive to explain
lawyers’ biased judgment, with particular attention to governmental and inhouse corporate attorneys who have no direct financial stake in their
clients’ cases.
Part II of this Article examines some of the most common cognitive
biases affecting partisans generally. Part III offers background in identity
theory, analyzes recent research on lawyer identity and decision making,
12
13

Id.
Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 96, 97

(2002).
14

See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 95; see also Bazerman et al., supra note 13, at 97.
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 95.
16
See HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 96 (1983) (“Most of the bias that
arises . . . cannot be described correctly as rooted in dishonesty—which perhaps makes it more
insidious than if it were.”).
15
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and applies identity theory to explain why lawyers in certain situations
may be particularly vulnerable to the cognitive biases outlined in Part II.
Part IV ties cognition, judgment, and identity together in a case study of
government-attorney decision making in the Office of Legal Counsel.
Finally, Part V identifies two situations in which there is a particularly high
risk of cognitive bias: first, situations in which the attorney performs a
policy making or managerial role in the client’s organization, and second,
where the attorney is motivated by a deep commitment to, and
identification with, a social cause beyond the case itself. Part V concludes
by offering recommendations for optimizing the independence of legal
advice in the face of powerful cognitive challenges.
II. PARTISANSHIP, ROLES, AND PERCEPTUAL FILTERS
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that “[i]n
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice.”17 Maintaining such independence
and neutrality may be easier said than done. Lawyers are never completely
independent of their clients, and the stronger their partisan18 affiliation with
their clients or with a related social cause, the greater the risk that they will
lack an independent perspective.19 The partisan bias that arises from such
affiliation may be viewed as a subtype of what has been referred to as
“cultural cognition”—the “psychological disposition of persons to conform
their factual beliefs about the instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of law to
their cultural evaluations of the activities subject to regulation.”20
This section discusses how partisan bias can affect both the extent to
which lawyers notice or attend to relevant issues and the interpretation they
give to those issues. Both attention and interpretation are essential to
decision making, and yet, as this section discusses, both are subject to the
possibility of bias.21 Noticing information “picks up major events and
gross trends,” while interpretation or “sensemaking,” by contrast, “focuses
17
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007). Independence and neutrality may also be
elements of a lawyer’s duty of competence, as competence requires “analysis of the factual and legal
elements of the problem.” Id. at R. 1.1 & cmt. 5 (2007).
18
The term “partisan” is used in its broadest sense of allegiance to a client and does not to refer
political partisanship.
19
See infra Part IV (discussing partisanship in context of torture memo controversy).
20
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of Public Policy, 24 YALE J. L. & PUB.
POLICY 149, 152 (2006). For purposes of this Article, I do not consider whether cognitive biases and
bounded rationality in general are epistemically distinct from cultural cognition; both frameworks
appear helpful for understanding the sources and effects of partisan bias, and neither is inconsistent
with an identity-theory approach to analyzing such bias. See Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1123–24 (2006) (book review) (noting controversy over whether “cultural
cognition” was different from, or a part of, bounded rationality).
21
William H. Starbuck & Frances J. Milliken, Executives’ Perceptual Filters: What They Notice
and How They Make Sense, in THE EXECUTIVE EFFECT 35, 60 (Donald C. Hambrick ed., 1988).
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on subtleties and interdependencies.” If information is tuned out or not
noticed, of course, then it is not available to be integrated into the lawyer’s
interpretation of the situation at hand.23
A. Selective Attention, Noticing, and Recall
All human beings filter information. People cannot pay equal attention
to everything in their environment—to do so would mean, for example,
that a person would hear “background noise as loudly as voice or music”
and would be unable to enjoy a symphony or to focus on partners in a
conversation.24 As a result, people must engage in perceptual filtering in
order to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information, attending
more to information they find relevant than to information they perceive as
irrelevant.25 For example, witnesses to a crime are typically better able to
recall the characteristics of the weapon used than the characteristics of the
perpetrator behind the weapon, as the weapon presents an immediate threat
that draws the witness’s focus.26
While filtering is necessary, it can introduce cognitive bias, as people’s
filters more often flag information favorable to preexisting beliefs or
desires as “relevant.”27 More than half a century ago, a pair of social
scientists documented the influence of partisanship on perception.28 They
showed undergraduate students from Dartmouth and Princeton a film of a
rowdy football game between the two schools. Both teams had been
repeatedly penalized for rule infractions, Princeton’s star player exited
during the second quarter with a broken nose, and a Dartmouth player
suffered a broken leg. The researchers who showed the film asked
students to count the number of rule infractions by each team, to rate those
infractions as “flagrant” or “mild,” and to determine which team started the
“rough play.”29
The Princeton students reached very different conclusions than the
Dartmouth students. They viewed the “facts” of the game differently,
22

Id.
Id.
24
Id. at 40; see also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 21
(1993) (“Perceptions are, by their very nature, selective.”).
25
Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 21, at 41.
26
Fredrik H. Leinfelt, Descriptive Eyewitness Testimony: The Influence of Emotionality, Racial
Identification, Question Style, and Selective Perception, 29 CRIM. JUST. REV. 317, 322 (2004).
27
Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 129, 129 (1954); see also Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 21, at 40. As well as introducing
bias, selective perception can also build on people’s preexisting biases; research has shown both that
eyewitnesses are better able to remember faces of people from their own racial group than from
distinctly different groups, and that they rated criminal acts as being more culpable when the
perpetrator is ethnically dissimilar to themselves. Leinfelt, supra note 26, at 321.
28
Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 27, at 129–30.
29
Id. at 130.
23
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paying selective attention to the facts favorable to their team. The
Princeton students recorded twice as many Dartmouth rule infractions as
Princeton ones and judged the Dartmouth rule infractions to be more often
flagrant than Princeton’s infractions.30 Eighty-six percent of Princeton
students believed that the Dartmouth team started the rough play.31 By
contrast, the Dartmouth students recorded nearly equal numbers of rule
infractions between the two teams and believed that fewer of their team’s
infractions were “flagrant.”32 Nor did they agree that their team had started
the rough play—a majority (fifty-three percent) of the Dartmouth students
stated that both teams started the rough play.33
Selective attention carries over into the legal and business spheres.34
In one study, researchers gave participants a file of information about a
negligence lawsuit and assigned them the role of either the motorcyclist
plaintiff or the car-driving defendant.35 The participants were paired up,
asked to attempt to reach a fair settlement, and told that the judge would
impose a significant penalty if they failed to reach a settlement.36
Participants were also asked to predict the judge’s award and to recall
arguments in favor of both sides.37 In spite of the fact that both sides
received identical information, participants’ predictions of the judges’
awards varied by role—those representing the plaintiff predicted awards
$14,537 higher than the awards predicted by those representing the
defendant.38 Both sides, when asked to list the arguments made in the
case, were more likely to recall arguments in their favor.39 Similar effects
have been reported in studies of other professionals.40
30

Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 131.
32
Id. at 131–32.
33
Id. at 131. By way of comparison, “[t]he official statistics of the game, which Princeton won,
showed that Dartmouth was penalized 70 yards, Princeton 25, not counting more than a few plays in
which both sides were penalized.” Id. at 129.
34
Behavioral economists often describe a professional’s tendency to selectively attend to
favorable information as a species of “self-serving bias.” See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093 (2000). This Article prefers to use the term “partisan bias” to encompass
situations in which the actor (here, usually the lawyer) may not personally benefit, but an associated
affiliate (here, usually the client) will. See Leigh Thompson, “They Saw a Negotiation”: Partisanship
and Involvement, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 839, 840–41 (1995) (noting that partisan
observers may be induced to find support for a particular outcome).
35
George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135, 145 (1993).
36
Id. at 145–46.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 150.
39
Id. at 150–51 (noting that the plaintiffs recalled an average of 1.04 more arguments favoring
themselves, while the defendants recalled an average of 2.79 more arguments favoring themselves).
40
See Don A. Moore et al., Auditor Independence, Conflict of Interest, and the Unconscious
Intrusion of Bias, available at https://littlehurt.gsia.cmu.edu/gsiadoc/wp/2002-19.pdf (accountants).
31
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Such variation in the prediction of litigation outcomes is likely to
affect the advice lawyers provide to their clients. If the plaintiff’s lawyer
values the claim higher than a neutral decision maker (such as judge or
jury) would actually award, then the lawyer would likely offer misleading
and unhelpful settlement advice to the client. Likewise, a defense attorney
who undervalues the plaintiff’s likely recovery would similarly offer
misleading advice. In both cases, the partisan bias compromises the
attorney’s ability to offer competent and truly independent advice. And in
both cases, the client is likely to end up disappointed in the lawyer when
the actual outcome is less favorable than the attorney had advised.
B. Selective Interpretation
While selective attention describes what facts are noticed, attended to,
and ultimately recalled, selective interpretation describes how those facts
are evaluated. Again, people’s roles and allegiances influence their
interpretations of an event. In the football game study, for example,
students from the two schools employed selective interpretation in
evaluating the motives and accusations surrounding the game.41 A
majority of Dartmouth students believed that Princeton was alleging that
“Dartmouth tried to get [Princeton’s star player]” and that Dartmouth
played “intentionally dirty.”42 Only ten percent of Dartmouth students
believed these allegations were actually true, whereas fifty-five percent of
Princeton students believed them.43 Students also differed as to why they
thought the charges were being made: Dartmouth students were more
likely to believe that the charges were made because Princeton’s star
player had been injured, while Princeton students were more likely to
believe that the charges were made to prevent repetition of such a rough
game.44 Thus, the different allegiances led to very different interpretations
of the controversy surrounding the game.
Selective interpretation can produce unintended consequences, as
shown by a study involving perceptions of Archie Bunker in the 1970s
television sitcom All in the Family. Bunker was an exaggeratedly bigoted
character; his actions on the show were intended by the producer to reduce
prejudice “by bringing bigotry out into the open and showing it to be
illogical.”45 Producers believed that the show satirized bigotry by
portraying Archie Bunker as a “fool,” and others agreed: the show won an

41

Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 27, at 130–32.
Id. at 131.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
WERNER J. SEVERIN & JAMES W. TANKARD, JR., COMMUNICATION THEORIES: ORIGINS,
METHODS, AND USES IN THE MASS MEDIA 80 (4th ed. 1997).
42
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award in 1972 from the NAACP.
However, when Neil Vidmar and
Milton Rokeach conducted a study of viewers in 1974, it became clear that
audience members interpreted the show in vastly different ways.47
Viewers who were themselves high in prejudice did not perceive that
Archie was being made fun of; instead, they were more likely to report that
one or more of the non-prejudiced characters on the show were more often
the target of the sitcom’s humor.48 When asked who “won” or who “lost”
on a particular show, those low in prejudice would pick Archie as the loser,
while those high in prejudice would pick one of the other characters.49
Thus, only those already low in prejudice were likely to pick up on the
show’s message of the illogicality of prejudice; those with preexisting bias
were likely to have their biases reinforced by the show.50
Selective interpretation could similarly affect a lawyer’s judgment
about a case. A plaintiff’s lawyer predisposed to sympathize with an
injured client may interpret ambiguous medical records as providing
greater support for her client’s claim of injury, while a defense attorney,
predisposed to be skeptical of the claim, may interpret those same records
less generously. In addition, lawyers on both sides may find their clients’
explanations of the situation more credible than a neutral observer would
find them to be. As with selective attention, selective interpretation is
likely to foster a belief that a client’s case is stronger than it actually is. To
the extent that this belief is communicated to the client, the client may end
up quite disappointed when the outcome of the case is less favorable than
the attorney had predicted.
C. Bias Blind Spot
Because individuals are not consciously aware of how cognitive biases
affect their perception, the biases cannot always be put aside even when
people make a concerted effort to maintain a neutral viewpoint. For
example, when study participants made efforts to view the football game
neutrally in order to participate in the study, their allegiance still
influenced—albeit unconsciously—their view of the game.
One
Dartmouth alumnus who viewed a film of the game had heard from a
Princeton alumni group about the many rule infractions committed by
Dartmouth players.51 When the Dartmouth alumnus was unable to
perceive the same infractions that the Princeton alumni had told him about,
46

Id.
Id. (citing Neil Vidmar & Milton Rokeach, Archie Bunker’s Bigotry: A Study in Selective
Perception and Exposure, 24 J. COM. 36, 40 (1974)).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 27, at 132.
47
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he assumed that the problem was an incomplete film, not a difference of
perception.52 He sent a telegram to the researchers: “Preview of Princeton
movies indicates considerable cutting of important part please wire
explanation and possibly air mail missing part before showing scheduled
for January 25 we have splicing equipment.”53
Even when people understand the existence of cognitive biases on a
theoretical level, they still tend to believe that their own judgment remains
unaffected. Researchers have been able to manipulate a “liking bias” by
asking subjects to evaluate a hypothetical roommate conflict involving
characters who were similar or dissimilar to the study participants—for
example, one character was described as a student who was “from
Alabama, liked country . . . music, and enjoyed sharing her religious views
with others.”54 Subjects were asked how much they liked each character,
how fair they felt they were being in mediating the conflict, and to what
extent they believed they were biased.55
The researchers concluded that the “liking bias” unconsciously
influenced participants’ responses.56 Although the study participants
believed that they were being fair and making decisions based on the
evidence, not on their preferences, their decisions did in fact differ based
on characters’ described traits. Furthermore, study participants remained
unaware of the effect of this situational bias even when the study “rather
blatant[ly]” introduced background material on the characters, making
study participants aware of factors such as religious preferences, music
preferences, and other background information.57 Thus, the researchers
concluded that “[e]ven though the information causing the preference [i.e.,
background material regarding music preferences, religious views, etc.]
was consciously perceived, the effects of this information on conflict
perceptions were not.”58
D. Effects of Partisan Bias
The effects of partisan affiliation, selective perception, and selective
interpretation can combine to cause people to experience the same events
in vastly different ways. They create individual realities that may not
match those of others: “We can watch a football game, a person eating a
hamburger, or a couple arguing as if these are ‘things’ that are ‘out there’
52

Id.
Id.
54
Cynthia McPherson Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to
Seeing Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 161 (2006).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 162.
57
Id. at 163.
58
Id.
53
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to be viewed in one way; and yet what we ‘see’ is significantly determined
by influences beyond our conscious purview.”59 Similarly, it is not that
Princeton and Dartmouth students merely had different attitudes about the
same game—instead, to them, there were two very different games.
Researchers in the football study concluded therefore “there is no such
‘thing’ as a ‘game’ existing ‘out there’ in its own right which people
merely ‘observe.’”60 “The game ‘exists’ for a person and is experienced by
him only in so far as certain happenings have significances in terms of his
purpose.”61
Lawyers are subject to the same cognitive processes that affect others.
The resulting viewpoint can be considered both a “partisan” bias that is
based on an affiliation with the client or a litigation-related social cause,
and a “self-serving” bias, as the lawyer benefits from the client’s success.62
This Article focuses on those situations in which there is no obvious
external benefit to the lawyer. It concludes that, in certain circumstances,
lawyers develop a partisan affiliation with a client or with a social cause
connected to the client, and it argues that this affiliation may very well lead
attorneys to unconsciously perceive the world favorably to their clients.
Thus, while outsiders may see red flags and may believe that no “fair
minded lawyer . . . could have countenanced” the client’s action,63 the
lawyer may have a very different view of reality.
III. IDENTITY THEORY
As discussed in the prior section, partisan affiliation can lead to
systematic cognitive biases. Accordingly, biases arising from the partisan
nature of the lawyer-client relationship can cloud and distort attorney
judgment. Simulations of settlement negotiations suggest that these biases
regularly affect legal judgment.64 The resulting failures in legal judgment
differ from case to case, however. Until now, little attention has been paid
to the question of what particular conditions or situational influences are
likely to trigger such biases. This Article suggests that recent research on
identity theory may shed some light on the conditions likely to predispose
attorneys to such cognitive biases and errors in judgment.
Identity theory, first articulated in 1966,65 focuses on the relationship
59
Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy
Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 518–19 (2008).
60
Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 27, at 133.
61
Id.
62
See Thompson, supra note 34, at 839; Loewenstein et al., supra note 35, at 140–41.
63
J.E. Pierce Apothecary, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 119, 149
n.16 (D. Mass. 2005).
64
Loewenstein et al., supra note 35, at 141.
65
Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory, 63 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 284, 284 n.2 (2000).
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of the individual to society. One of its major principles is that individuals
define themselves in part through the groups they interact with in society
and the roles they take on—for example, a person may be, at the same
time, a spouse, a parent, a teacher, a southerner, a member of the middle
class, and a leader.66 Each of these categories possesses certain culturally
shared meanings and expectations. When people internalize the meanings
and expectations associated with these categories, these roles and group
memberships are termed “identities,” and become “a set of standards that
guide behavior.”67
Of course, each person possesses a number of identities, and not all
will guide behavior at a given time. A second major part of identity theory
is the concept of “salience,” which is defined as the likelihood of a
particular identity’s activation.68 Thus, “the higher the salience of an
identity relative to other identities incorporated into the self, the greater the
probability of behavioral choices in accord with the expectations attached
to that identity.”69 Salience, in turn, is related to commitment—“the
degree to which persons’ relationships to others in their networks depend
on possessing a particular identity and role.”70 Empirical research supports
the idea that commitment shapes the salience of an identity, and salience in
turn shapes behavior.71 In one study, for example, researchers found that
commitment to role relationships based on a religious identity predicted the
salience of the religious identities—so a person with close family, friends,
or other significant relationships in a shared religion is likely to have a
more salient religious identity than a person with fewer ties.72 In turn, the
salience of the religious identity predicted the amount of time persons
spent in religious activities.73
A. Lawyers’ Identities
Lawyers, like other individuals, possess a salience hierarchy of
identities that influence behavior. While few scholars have examined
lawyer behavior through the lens of identity theory, one study of corporate
66
See Matthew O. Hunt, Identities and Inequalities: Exploring Links Between Self and
Stratification Processes, in ADVANCES IN IDENTITY THEORY AND RESEARCH 71, 76–77 (Peter J. Burke
et al. eds., 2003).
67
Jan E. Stets & Peter J. Burke, Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q.
224, 225 (2000) (“In identity theory, the core of an identity is the categorization of the self as an
occupant of a role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and expectations associated
with that role and its performance.”).
68
Id. at 230.
69
Stryker & Burke, supra note 65, at 286.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
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counsel may shed some light on attorney decision making. Hugh and Sally
Gunz, professors of organizational behavior and business law, respectively,
surveyed several hundred Canadian attorneys who worked in-house as
corporate counsel.74 The attorneys were asked questions about how long
they had worked for the corporation, how involved they were with the
corporation’s strategic decision making, and whether they were part of the
corporation’s top management team.75 They were also asked to rate their
view of their role as a corporate lawyer to establish whether they viewed
themselves more as an employee (who also happened to have a law degree)
or more as a lawyer (who also happened to be employed by the
corporation).76 The researchers used this scale as an approximation of
identity salience—those lower on the scale were said to have a more salient
“professional” identity, and those higher on the scale were said to have a
more salient “organizational” identity.77
The researchers then examined whether the relative salience of the
“organizational” and “professional” identities would affect lawyer
behavior.78 Specifically, the survey then presented the attorneys with a
series of four vignettes, each of which presented a dilemma and required
the attorney to assess how he or she would advise the corporate client.79
The vignettes were intended not to be leading, but each did have both a
generally accepted “professionally correct” course of action and another
possible course of action that was more deferential to the organization’s
leadership.80 For example, one vignette was based on actual events
occurring at Texaco.81 The lawyer in the scenario observes senior
colleagues at the corporation frequently making racist comments. The
lawyer is faced with a choice of options. The first option is to approach the
colleagues privately to explain that their comments put the company at risk
and suggest to them that they “relax only when they are meeting with
colleagues in whom they have great trust.”82 The second option is to put
74
Hugh Gunz & Sally Gunz, Hired Professional to Hired Gun: An Identity Theory Approach to
Understanding the Ethical Behaviour of Professionals in Non-Professional Organizations, 60 HUM.
REL. 851, 859 (2007).
75
Id. at 864.
76
Id. (providing a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “Lawyer with captive client,” 3 being “Both
lawyer with client and employee with law degree,” and 5 being “Employee of organization who
happens to have [a] law degree”).
77
See id. at 855 (defining the two identities as “organizational” and “professional”).
78
Id. at 874.
79
Id. at 861–63.
80
Id. at 874.
81
Id. at 861; see also Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, on Tape, Discussed Impeding a Bias
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at A1 (discussing an incident involving Texaco board members);
Courtland Milloy, Texaco Taps a Deep Well of Racism, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1996, at B1 (discussing
the Texaco incident).
82
Gunz & Gunz, supra note 74, at 886.
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the issue on the agenda for the top management team to discuss and to
report the matter to the board of directors if the management team fails to
take appropriate action.83
In another vignette, the attorney was told that the corporation’s CEO is
contracting with a personal friend for corporate services and that the
contractor appears to be overcharging for his work.84 The attorney is again
presented with close-ended options and is asked which is preferable.85 In
the first option, the attorney will request proposals from other suppliers,
bring an alternative proposal to the CEO, and, if necessary, bring it to the
board of directors. In the second option, the attorney will still request
proposals and bring them to the CEO’s attention, but will defer to the
CEO’s judgment if the CEO decides not to pursue the matter.86
Just as identity theory suggests, the researchers did in fact find that the
relative salience of the “organizational” and “professional” identities
affected reported behavior.87 Attorneys who identified more strongly as
employees were statistically more likely to choose the more
organizationally deferential options in the vignettes, and those who
identified more strongly as “lawyers with a captive client” were more
likely to choose the more professionally oriented option.88 The researchers
therefore concluded that the salience of lawyer identity does shape ethical
behavior.89
The researchers had also hypothesized that the lawyers’ commitment
to their roles as “employee” and “lawyer” would influence the salience of
those identities. Again, the data supported that hypothesis.90 The survey
results demonstrated a correlation between the amount of time spent on
activities that do not require a law degree (such as business planning,
management, and administration) and the salience of the “organizational”
identity—that is, the more time the attorney spent on business concerns,
the more the attorney identified as an “employee” of the corporation rather
than as a “lawyer with a captive client.”91
The researchers did not focus on the distinction between lawyer
behavior and lawyer judgment. Nevertheless, the survey results suggest
that identity salience can affect judgment as well as behavior. The
vignettes were phrased to ask not what the attorney would do, but what the

83

Id.
Id. at 882.
85
Id. at 883.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 871.
88
Id. at 868, 870–71.
89
Id. at 870–71.
90
Id. at 868, 871.
91
Id. at 868, 870–71.
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attorney should do. If identity influenced behavior alone, then one might
expect that an attorney with a strong “organizational” role would be able to
recognize the professionally correct response, but, perhaps fearful of the
consequences, would be unable or unwilling to enact it. Such behavior
would reinforce the venality hypothesis, noted earlier, which suggests that
the lawyers must be somewhat complicit in client misconduct.93
Essentially, such lawyers would suffer not from an ability to see the proper
response, but rather from a lack of moral courage in implementing that
response.
Interestingly, however, the responses to the vignettes suggest that the
problem is not merely one of moral courage—instead, there is evidence
that, at least in certain conditions, lawyers truly do not recognize the
“professionally correct” course of action. Under the wording of the
vignettes, the attorneys were asked to make a judgment call about the
correct answer without considering whether they themselves would be
capable of taking that action. Because the attorneys’ responses reported
differences in judgment (what an attorney “should” do), not just behavior
(what the particular attorney “would” do), the study supports the
conclusion that lawyer identity can in fact shape lawyer judgment.94
B. Self-Verification: Linking Judgment, Behavior, and Identity
The Gunz and Gunz study did not examine how lawyers’ identities
shaped their answers to the vignettes. Identity theory, however, suggests
that a mechanism called “self-verification” ties both behavior and
Self-verification is the process by which
judgment to identity.95
individuals maintain a stable set of identities.96 When a particular identity
is activated in a given situation, the internalized meanings and expectations
associated with the identity act as a standard that the person then compares
to his or her “perceptions of meanings within the situation.”97 That is,
individuals compare their own self-perception to the feedback they get
from others. When a person’s situational perceptions match his or her
identity standard, self-verification occurs and the person experiences

92

Id. at 882–86.
See supra text accompanying notes 4–11.
94
Gunz & Gunz, supra note 74, at 874.
95
Stets & Burke, supra note 67, at 232.
96
Researchers have found that people are motivated to maintain stable identities, as “people tend
to resist changes in their self—both the structure (e.g., current salience hierarchy) and the meanings
defining the identities they hold.” Peter J. Burke, Introduction to ADVANCES IN IDENTITY THEORY
AND RESEARCH 1, 4 (Peter J. Burke et al. eds., 2003).
97
Stryker & Burke, supra note 65, at 287.
93
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positive emotions. So, for example, someone who identifies herself as a
“good student” will compare this identity to the feedback she gets from
others around her. When she receives an “A” on an exam, her internal
identity standard matches her perception of how others see her, and she
experiences self-verification. Her student identity is reinforced, and she
experiences positive emotions.
Identity theory suggests that lawyers with a more salient
“organizational” identity are acting to maintain that identity when they
choose a course of action in the vignettes. By choosing the course of
action associated with organizational deference, those with a more salient
“employee/organizational” identity are reaffirming their view of
themselves as organizational agents who implement company objectives.
Those with a more salient “lawyer/professional” identity similarly reaffirm
their view of themselves as advisors to the organizations who provide
neutral counsel.
Research in identity theory further suggests that when an identity
standard does not match the situational perception (for example, when an
“A-level student” receives a “B” on an exam), then negative emotions such
as anger, depression, and distress may result.99 In such a situation, the
person will act to bridge the gap between the situational perception and the
identity standard, either by changing the situation (for example, by
modifying study habits in an effort to improve grades in the future) or by
“seeking and creating new situations in which perceived self-relevant
meanings match those of the identity standard” (perhaps by redefining
academic success to include being at a certain class rank, rather than
defining success by letter grades alone, or perhaps by identifying a
particular sphere of success, such as moot court or other academic
activities).100
98
See Jan E. Stets, Justice, Emotion, and Identity Theory, in ADVANCES IN IDENTITY THEORY
RESEARCH 105, 107 (Peter J. Burke et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the role of emotion in identity
theory).
99
Stryker & Burke, supra note 65, at 288.
100
Id. Recent research in the area of cultural cognition has reached similar conclusions, though
approaching the issue from a slightly different perspective. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and
Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 465, 497–98 (2007) (“[I]ndividuals tend to conform their view of the risks of putatively
dangerous activities—commerce and technology, guns, abortion—to their cultural evaluations of them.
Because individuals’ identities are threatened when they encounter information that challenges beliefs
commonly held within their group, the result is political conflict over risk regulation among groups
committed to opposing hierarchical and egalitarian, individualistic and communitarian worldviews.”);
Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in ‘Acquaintance
Rape’ Cases 3 (Yale Law Sch. Cultural Cognition Project Working Paper No. 29, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1437742 (noting that “[p]eople who share
formative identities tend to apprehend facts in a similar way in part because they are likely to be
drawing on common life experiences when interpreting what various events signify,” and concluding
that, “more importantly,” they are also likely to form perceptions of how the world works that match
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Self-verification strategies are not always apparent to the individual.
Researchers have divided self-verifying strategies as “overt/behavioral”
and “covert/cognitive.”101 Overt/behavioral strategies include the choices a
person makes consciously—where to work and with whom to interact
with.102 Thus, an attorney whose identity includes a strong commitment to
public justice may consciously decide to take a job working for Legal Aid.
Covert/cognitive strategies, by contrast, do not involve conscious choice.
Instead, they include the cognitive biases described in Part II—both
selective attention (“self-verifying information is given attention and
processed, and information that is not self-confirming is ignored”) and
selective interpretation (“endorsing feedback that fits self-views and
denying feedback that does not fit self-views”).103
Selective perception and related cognitive biases may offer a way to
counteract the existence of non-verifying situational feedback (that is,
external feedback that does not match a person’s internal view of
themselves). Empirical research has found that “[i]f self-discrepant
feedback is unavoidable, people may construct the illusion of selfconfirming worlds by ‘seeing’ more support for their self-views than
actually exists.”104 Thus, people with positive self-views will spend more
time scrutinizing favorable feedback than unfavorable feedback, and after
undergoing an evaluation they will remember more favorable statements
than unfavorable statements.105
People are also more trusting of information that confirms their selfview. Psychologist William Swann notes that “people may nullify
discrepant evaluations by selectively dismissing incongruent feedback.”106
When evaluations are proffered, people “express more confidence” in
those evaluators whose conclusions match individuals’ self-conceptions.107
These unconscious processes have a very real effect on judgment and
“may systematically skew people’s perceptions of reality.”108 When these
cognitive processes are invoked, people may “conclude that their social
worlds are far more supportive of their self-views than is warranted.”109
Thus, while the cognitive strategies associated with self-verification may
their appraisals of how it should work in order to avoid dissonance and to protect their status within
groups whose members share their core values).
101
Jan E. Stets & Alicia D. Cast, Resources and Identity Verification from an Identity Theory
Perspective, 50 SOC. PERSP. 517, 522 (2007).
102
Id. at 522.
103
Id.
104
William B. Swann, Jr., The Trouble With Change: Self-Verification and Allegiance to the Self,
8 PSYCH. SCI. 177, 178 (1997).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
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109
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play a beneficial role on an individual level, they do not assist an attorney
with the task of providing independent judgment—in fact, they inhibit it.
C. Self-Verification and Partisanship
How does self-verification of attorneys’ role identities work in
practice? Judge John T. Noonan has described one case that exemplifies
the factors at work in self-verification of an attorney’s role.110 In the
1930s, attorney Hoyt Moore represented Bethlehem Steel Corporation.111
When a company that Bethlehem very much wanted to acquire was placed
in receivership, Moore bribed a federal judge overseeing the receivership
to put Bethlehem in a position where it would be able to acquire the
Moore was not motivated by money; in fact, his
company.112
compensation was relatively insignificant.113 Instead, Noonan writes,
Moore “identified with the client—an identification easier, rather than
harder, when the client was not a single flesh and blood individual, but a
corporation, which no one individual encapsulated. For many purposes,
Moore was Bethlehem. It became his alter ego.”114
Noonan further argues that “[a]t the same time that [Moore] identified
with the client, he wanted to prove to its officers, the men with whom he
dealt, that he was the master of the situation, that there was nothing his
client wanted that he could not bring off.”115 Thus, Moore’s identity
standard defined him as a person with a high level of competence and
mastery, one who could accomplish the company’s objectives. Acquiring
the company desired by Bethlehem allowed him to verify that identity—his
success in the venture verified his standing as a titan of industry. The
psychological gain from self-verification motivated Moore to bribe a
federal judge, even when no significant material gain was present.
Of course, the desire for self-verification does not drive most attorneys
to extreme or illegal behavior. But empirical work supports Judge
Noonan’s intuition that self-verification shapes attorney behavior and
judgment, even if not typically to the degree found in Moore’s case. The
Gunz and Gunz study suggests that attorneys with a more salient
organizational identity are more likely to support a course of action desired
by corporate management, even when doing so would contravene
110
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lawyer Who Overidentifies with His Client, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
827, 834 (2001).
111
Id. at 835.
112
See id. at 837–38 (discussing how Moore oversaw the receivership so that others were
discouraged from bidding for the company and the judge approved his own bribe).
113
See id. at 840 (“Moore could have foregone his share of the fee without discomfort. The
motivation of this driven man was not money—certainly not money only.”).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 841.
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traditional professional obligations.
Moore was not an employee of
Bethlehem, but he nevertheless identified himself as an agent of the
corporation who benefited psychologically from the corporation’s success.
According to identity theory’s conception of self-verification, it makes
sense that a more salient organizational identity would be linked with
higher levels of selective attention to facts and circumstances favorable to
the corporation.
There are two possible explanations for why a more salient
organizational identity would lead to a selective focus on information
favorable to corporate management. First, as Gunz and Gunz noted, a
more salient organizational identity is correlated with a larger management
role—those attorneys who were more involved in the corporation’s
leadership structure and more responsible for managerial outcomes were
more likely to have salient organizational identities.117 Given the
attorneys’ management responsibilities, it is likely that verification of their
organizational identities required a favorable managerial outcome—when
the organization’s managers obtained their desired outcome, the
organizational identity standard was verified. When managerial goals were
met, the attorneys received feedback verifying their success as agents of
the corporation.
Second, the organizational identity is, by its nature, more deferential to
corporate management than is the professional identity. While the
organizational identity requires a favorable managerial outcome, it does
not require that the attorney achieve results beyond those desired by
corporate management. Thus, when the attorney defers to the CEO on
contracting decisions or privately advises management on the dangers of
racist comments, the attorney has done enough to obtain positive feedback
that reinforces the attorney’s identity as a valued employee.
Given the alignment between the organization and the individual
attorney, the attorney is predisposed to notice facts and circumstances that
support organizational goals. And when events or circumstances are
subject to more than one interpretation, the attorney is motivated to
interpret them in favor of the corporation. Even when the information is
not truly ambiguous, the attorney may be blind to non-supportive facts—in
Swann’s words, the attorney may be “‘seeing’ more support . . . than

116
Moore’s actions also represent what is often termed “ethical fading,” which is the “tendency to
interpret the situation so that it does not implicate one’s ethical or moral responsibility.” Andrew M.
Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 470 (2007).
117
This may have been primarily a function of time spent on professional versus organizational
work. See Gunz & Gunz, supra note 74, at 874 (“The more a corporate counsel worked as a member of
the [top management team], the less time he or she had for professional work, and the more salient his
or her organization identity by comparison with his or her professional identity.”).
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actually exists.”
An attorney with a more salient “lawyer” or “professional” identity
faces different pressures. On the one hand, there is likely to be less
pressure to offer advice that management would find pleasing. While selfverification of the organizational identity requires feedback favorable to
the organization’s management, self-verification of the professional
identity, by contrast, does not require any particular organizational
outcome. As long as the attorney is satisfied that he or she has provided
high-quality counsel, the identity standard is verified—whether or not
management is actually pleased to receive the advice.
On the other hand, a more salient professional identity may push the
attorney to take actions beyond those that would satisfy the attorney with a
more salient organizational identity. While the attorney would have less of
an interest in pleasing management, he or she would have a greater interest
in ensuring that the attorney’s advice was heard by those empowered to
make a decision. After all, if the attorney stopped short of offering advice
to the highest-level decision makers, he or she would not be fulfilling the
expected lawyer role, which includes advising the corporation at the
highest level.119 Thus, again, it makes sense that attorneys with a more
salient professional identity were more willing to provide advice directly to
the board of directors in both the racism vignette and the contracting
vignette.
Finally, while the organizational identity is associated with a stronger
desire for an outcome favorable to management, the action of cognitive
biases may actually prevent a favorable outcome from occurring. In the
racism vignette, for example, the attorneys with a more salient
organizational identity were more willing to privately advise management
to avoid public expressions of racism. These attorneys may have
interpreted the situation in the light most favorable to the corporation,
assuming that management would indeed curtail the practices and
underestimating the probability that they would come to light. In the
actual situation on which the vignette was based, the facts did come to
light; perhaps unsurprisingly (to anybody not affiliated with the
corporation), Texaco then faced a number of lawsuits and saw its stock
decline.120 Managers who made the statements left the corporation and lost
their retirement benefits as punishment.121
118

Swann, supra note 104, at 178.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007) (requiring the attorney in these
circumstances to “refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the
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applicable law”).
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IV. CASE STUDY—YOO, GOLDSMITH, AND THE TORTURE MEMOS
The Gunz and Gunz study suggests that attorneys’ identities are indeed
linked to judgment and behavior, just as identity theory suggests.
However, the study remained hypothetical. It asked attorneys to identify
the correct course of action, but did not study what attorneys in real-life
situations actually do when confronted with such ethical dilemmas. Such
real-life data would be exceedingly difficult to collect. While it is easy
enough to identify ethical dilemmas in hindsight, it is much more difficult
to learn what attorneys were thinking as they made their decisions and
offered their counsel. Even if attorneys could be surveyed, their
confidentiality obligations would generally prohibit them from disclosing
information about their representation.122 And when ethical dilemmas (and
associated corporate scandals) do arise, clients are particularly unlikely to
consent to their attorneys’ disclosure of their thoughts and strategies,
especially if they are facing a threat of litigation.123
The Justice Department’s interrogation memos therefore provide an
interesting opportunity to examine the connection between attorney
identity and judgment in context. The scandal surrounding these memos
offers an important perspective on the relationship between identity and
judgment.
Both the secrecy and the informational problems are
minimized, as much of the information about the case has been made
publicly available and/or declassified by the government, and both of the
major participants in the drama have written books that provide a great
deal of insight into their thoughts, motivations, and legal judgment.
A. Questioning the Memos
In 2002, John Yoo, a deputy in the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”),
prepared a memorandum124 opining in part that interrogations inflicting
pain do not qualify as torture unless the pain rises “to a level that would
ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious physical condition or
injury such as death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body
functions.”125 Yoo imported a definition of torture from a statute that
122
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007) (providing that “[a] lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client,” except in certain circumstances, none of
which include general data collection).
123
See, e.g., John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 60 n.12 (2005) (stating that an Enron prosecutor “declin[ed] to
discuss the role of lawyers in the Enron case” because he “could not adequately address the subject
without disclosing confidential nonpublic information”).
124
Rosen, supra note 11 (noting that Yoo has acknowledged drafting the memorandum).
125
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§2340–
2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172, 176 (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
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authorized benefits for emergency health conditions; the health benefit
statute used the phrase “severe pain” as a possible indicator of an
emergency condition that might cause serious harm if not immediately
treated.126
The memo also concluded that “there is [a] significant range of acts
that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment,” they nevertheless “fail to rise to the level of torture.”127 In
addition, it suggested that application of anti-torture laws to the challenged
conduct “may be unconstitutional” if the President had authorized the acts
under his Commander-in-Chief powers, and it further opined that
“necessity or self-defense” could also provide adequate defenses to a
potential prosecution for torture.128
The 2002 memo was withdrawn two years later by Jack Goldsmith,
who had been appointed to lead the OLC.129 Goldsmith concluded that the
memo was poorly reasoned and represented a failure in legal judgment.130
Outsiders generally agreed that the memo, at a minimum, reflected poor
lawyering—it was “widely regarded as preposterous,”131 even
“spectacularly bizarre.”132 The memo was criticized for defining torture
“by lifting language from a Medicare statute on medical emergencies,”
“ignor[ing] inconvenient Supreme Court precedents,” and “flatly
misrepresent[ing] what sources said.”133 The revised memo omitted Yoo’s
narrow definition of torture and abandoned its reliance on the Medicare
statute. While Goldsmith conceded that “[i]t is very hard to say in the
abstract what the phrase ‘severe pain’ means,” he concluded that Yoo’s
“clumsy definitional arbitrage didn’t even seem in the ballpark.”134
Goldsmith questioned how Yoo, a good attorney and friend, could
have written such a poorly reasoned memo:
How could this have happened? How could OLC have
written opinions that, when revealed to the world weeks after
the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, made it seem as though the
126
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 145 (2007).
127
See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, supra note 125, at 214.
128
Id.
129
Rosen, supra note 11.
130
GOLDSMITH, supra note 126, at 165.
131
David Luban, Torture and the Professions, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 2007, at 2, 59.
132
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 159 (2007); see also W. Bradley
Wendel, 2008 F.W. Wickwire Memorial Lecture: Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror,
DALHOUSIE L. J. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1372744 (“In this case, the
arguments relied upon by the Bush administration lawyers are so far outside the range of reasonable
that it is impossible to take them seriously. That is the basis for concluding that these lawyers acted
unethically.”).
133
Luban, Torture and the Professions, supra note 131, at 59.
134
GOLDSMITH, supra note 126, at 145.
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administration was giving official sanction to torture . . . .
How could its opinions reflect such bad judgment, be so
poorly reasoned, and have such terrible tone?135
Again, the venality hypothesis came into play, as Goldsmith suggested that
a combination of a fearful atmosphere and pressure from the White House
may have played a role in creating the memo.136 But Yoo vehemently
disagreed; he staunchly defended the memo’s reasoning and denied facing
any White House pressure.137 The White House, he said, had been “hands
off” when it came to drafting the memo, and he stood by its conclusions.138
Furthermore, the White House seems to have lacked incentive to pressure
Yoo to give the broad interpretation that he offered, given that even the
narrower opinion later substituted for the original memo authorized the
same interrogation procedures that the White House had inquired about.139
Thus, it appears that Yoo’s memo had actually given a more deferential
opinion than was needed to support the acknowledged interrogation
procedures.
While Yoo denies a political motivation in writing the original memo,
he sees a political motivation in its withdrawal. Referring to the decision
to substitute a revised memo, he states, “Its purpose was to give the White
House political cover by making the language more vague, and thus,
presumably, more politically correct.”140 Yoo decries the decision to
withdraw the memo, asserting that “[i]t harmed our ability to prevent
future al-Qaeda attacks by forcing our agents in the field to operate in a
He concludes that the focus on
vacuum of generalizations.”141
“professional responsibility” in providing reliable advice was merely
political cover, “a short-term political maneuver in response to political
criticism”:
[T]he differences in the opinions were for appearances’
sake . . . . For some new officials at Justice, who came onto
the job years after 9/11, withdrawing the 2002 opinion wasn’t
enough. It was as if, sensing the 2004 opinion’s ambivalence
135

Id. at 165.
Rosen, supra note 11. Others, however, assert that the opinion was designed to provide legal
cover to Bush Administration officials. BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY
191 (2008) (“[T]he opinion was commissioned specifically to give formal blessing to methods the vice
president and war cabinet had authorized in the White House Situation Room.”).
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Rosen, supra note 11.
138
Id.
139
See Luban, Torture and the Professions, supra note 131, at 59 (noting that “the changes were
merely cosmetic—and, in fact, the substitute memo states in a footnote that all tactics approved under
the previous memo are still approved”).
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JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR viii
(2006).
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Id. at viii–ix.
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and its decision to muddy the legal waters, these individuals
decided they needed to go to extraordinary lengths to
discredit the first opinion. They ordered the opening of an
investigation . . . to determine whether we had violated our
professional responsibilities in providing legal advice.142
Why would Yoo and Goldsmith have such radically different
judgments about what interrogation procedures are authorized by law?
Yoo’s memo has been widely criticized, even by those generally
sympathetic to the administration.143 Goldsmith’s views, while still subject
to criticism as overly favorable to torture, are generally considered legally
reasonable if ill-advised—his views are not considered legally
“preposterous,” as were Yoo’s.144 An examination of Yoo’s and
Goldsmith’s books through the lens of identity theory suggests two
explanations: a difference in the salience of their political identities and a
different commitment to policy making roles in the Bush administration.
B. Multiple Roles: Policy Making and Providing Legal Advice
Yoo and Goldsmith played different roles in the Bush administration.
Yoo had a significant policy making role in addition to his position as legal
counsel. He was a member of the War Council, a “secretive five-person
group with enormous influence over the administration’s antiterrorism
policies.”145 He was also one of the few Executive Branch representatives
at a series of meetings with Congressional leaders that developed
legislation authorizing the use of military force against al-Qaeda.146
Goldsmith, in contrast, focused on law, rather than policy.147 He
acknowledged that he might be asked to opine about matters other than the
law, and he was willing to do so: “When appropriate, I put on my
counselor’s hat and added my two cents about the wisdom of
counterterrorism policies.”148 But ultimately he believed that any policy
advice he offered must be subordinate to his role as a legal advisor; he
wrote that his job “was not to decide whether these policies were wise. It
was to make sure they were implemented lawfully.”149
Just as the Gunz and Gunz study demonstrated that a greater
142

Id. at 183.
GOLDSMITH, supra note 126, at 165.
144
Luban, Torture and the Professions, supra note 131, at 59.
145
GOLDSMITH, supra note 126, at 22.
146
YOO, supra note 140, at 116.
147
GOLDSMITH, supra note 126, at 147.
148
Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007) (“In rendering advice, a lawyer
may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
149
GOLDSMITH, supra note 126, at 147.
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involvement in management was linked with corporate counsel having a
more salient organizational identity, it is likely that Yoo’s policy work and
greater commitment to a policy making role gave him a more salient
“policy maker” identity. Others noticed that Yoo’s policy making role and
his “close working relationship” with the White House “alienated his
Department of Justice boss, John Ashcroft.”150 This alienation prevented
Yoo from being promoted into the top OLC job ultimately held by
Goldsmith. The alienation may also have weakened Yoo’s ties to his role
as legal counsel,151 while pushing him even farther into a policy making
role.
Thus, it appears that the role identities of “lawyer” and “policy maker”
competed against each other to shape—and perhaps distort—Yoo’s view
of the legal limits of torture. Just as the lawyers who viewed themselves
primarily as “employees” in the Gunz and Gunz study were more likely to
view the world in accordance with corporate management, Yoo’s policy
making role likely pushed him to view the situation in line with leaders of
the Bush administration.152 Ironically, this shared perspective may have
led Yoo to offer a more aggressive legal opinion than was actually required
to meet the administration’s legal goals, and the opinion left the
administration highly vulnerable to outside criticism.153 Goldsmith is
critical of the administration’s tendency to bring Yoo and other lawyers
into the policy making field, writing: “The irony of the lawyer-dominated
approach to counterterrorism policy is that the lawyers who didn’t do so
well at statecraft also ended up not doing so well in the arena of their
expertise.”154 It may well be that greater involvement in policy making did
in fact cause Yoo and others to lose their independent perspective and to
therefore lose their ability to accurately predict how the outside world
150

Id. at 23.
Although he was a political appointee, Ashcroft appears to have played more of a
“legal/professional” role in the administration, as onlookers note that he “pushed back against the
administration’s most blatant attempts to circumvent the law.” Editorial, Lawless and Soon Long
Gone, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, at A16.
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Tung Yin, Great Minds Think Alike: The “Torture Memo,” Office Of Legal Counsel, and
Sharing The Boss’s Mindset, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 473, 502 (2009).
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See supra Part III.A. (discussing lawyers’ identification of themselves as employees or
lawyers).
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GOLDSMITH, supra note 126, at 34. Interestingly, this criticism parallels an earlier occasion
when Bernard Nussbaum, White House Counsel under President Clinton, attempted to resist a DOJ
search of Vincent Foster’s office after his suicide. Nussbaum resigned after facing “political fallout”
from his decision, giving rise to the question, “How could a lawyer as brilliant and accomplished as
Bernard Nussbaum make such a calamitous misjudgment?” Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Law as
Rationalization: Getting Beyond Reason to Business Ethics, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 959, 969–70 (2006).
Again, the answer seems to lie in rationalization and self-deception: “The real problem was that he
persuaded himself he was right, because his reason told him what ought to be the legal result, and that
effort was a massive exercise in self-deception, not because he was wrong about the law, but because
he was wrong about the world.” Id. at 971.
151

2009]

JUDGMENT, IDENTITY AND INDEPENDENCE

27

would view their legal opinions.
C. Salience of Political Identity
Yoo and Goldsmith also appear to differ in the relative salience of their
political identities. On the surface, their political identities share many
similarities. Both identify themselves as conservative and Republican, and
both worked in the Bush administration. However, deeper examination
suggests that a Republican identity was much more salient for Yoo than it
was for Goldsmith.
In his book, Goldsmith describes himself as “conservative,” but notes
that he “didn’t know any Republican Party politicians” and “had never
given money to a Republican campaign.”155 Goldsmith also states that he
“lacked the usual political credentials for the [OLC] job.”156
When Goldsmith was interviewed for the OLC position, the Deputy
White House Counsel questioned why he had once donated to a
Democratic friend’s campaign for office, but never donated money to a
Republican campaign. Goldsmith responded that “I considered myself
conservative and a Republican, but that I had never had much interest in
politics, and it had never occurred to me to give money to any campaign
until [the friend] had asked.”157 The fact that it had “never occurred to
him” to donate suggests that Goldsmith’s political identity was not
particularly high in the salience hierarchy.
Yoo’s political identity, on the other hand, appears to be significantly
more salient. He describes attending a pre-9/11 dinner with Ted and
Barbara Olson, where they enjoyed talking “about the usual inside-theBeltway gossip, who was up, who was down, the biggest mistakes, the
latest rivalries.”158 Yoo’s book suggests that his political identity was
important to him; he spent time thinking about political intrigue and
enjoyed sharing such discussions with his friends.159 Thus, while
Goldsmith may have been a “conservative lawyer,” Yoo on the other hand
seems to be a “conservative cause lawyer”—that is, he identified deeply
and personally with the conservative cause.160
Goldsmith’s less-salient political identity may have allowed him to be
155

GOLDSMITH, supra note 126, at 20.
Id.
157
Id. at 26.
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See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Professional Identity and Political Commitment Among Lawyers
for Conservative Causes, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYER MAKE 83, 85–86 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 2005) (describing a conservative “cause lawyer” as one who identifies deeply and
personally with a client’s cause); Kevin C. McMunigal, Of Causes and Clients: Two Tales of Roe v.
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more independent than Yoo. Goldsmith noted that others in the
administration were sometimes displeased with OLC opinions that offered
advice they did not wish to hear.161 But he felt that he was “immune” to
their disapproval “because the Senate had confirmed [him], because [he]
loved [his] ‘real’ job as an academic, and because [he] had no higher
government ambition.”162
Thus, Yoo’s political identity may have been more closely tied to his
legal opinions than Goldsmith’s was. Yoo’s eagerness to discuss “who
was up” and “who was down” in the political establishment suggests that,
unlike Goldsmith, Yoo harbored greater political ambitions. And there are
other indications that Yoo’s political identity predominated. For example,
Yoo criticizes the lawyers who brought legal challenges to military
commissions, noting that although they “were only doing their job by
providing their clients with the most vigorous defense possible,” such
“[l]awyering is beginning to strangle our government’s ability to fight and
win the wars of the twenty-first century”—thus seeming to suggest that
traditional lawyering should be subordinate to policies promoting national
security.163
Viewing Yoo’s and Goldsmith’s behavior through the lens of identity
theory suggests an explanation for why the two men who seemed to have
so much in common—both conservative, both academics, and both highly
accomplished lawyers—could offer their client such radically different
legal analyses. Unlike Goldsmith, Yoo played a significant policy role in
the Bush administration. His later commentary suggests that his policy
role predominated over his legal role. Tellingly, his criticism of the
decision to withdraw the August 2002 memo focuses on the policy
ramifications (i.e., “harm[ing] our ability to prevent future [al–Qaeda]
attacks”) rather than the quality of the legal advice itself.164 Yoo’s political
identity also appeared to be significantly more salient than Goldsmith’s;
though both were conservative, Yoo’s political identity was more likely to
assert itself in his day-to-day life. Two situational forces pushed Yoo to
became closer to his client, the Bush administration. Both his policy
making role in the administration and his political identity, shared with
other administration insiders, likely caused his judgment to more closely
resemble that of other Bush administration officials. Goldsmith, on the
other hand, was able to be a more neutral adviser. Thus, it appears that
Yoo and Goldsmith’s differing roles and identity structures shaped their
161
GOLDSMITH, supra note 126, at 170–71 (stating that David Addington, counsel to the Vice
President, and Attorney General Gonzales “did not always acquiesce in OLC opinions that reached
uncongenial conclusions”).
162
Id.
163
YOO, supra note 140, at 209.
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Id. at viii.
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judgment—and hence their advice to the Bush administration—in very
different ways.
D. Legal Advice or Legal Cover?
The argument that Yoo’s political identity rendered his legal advice
less-than-independent and therefore fundamentally unreliable presupposes
that Yoo’s memo was in fact intended to provide legal advice.
Commentators have suggested, however, that Yoo’s memo may not have
been intended to provide neutral advice at all.165 Instead, they suggest the
memo may have been intended to provide “legal cover” to the
administration.166 Perhaps the administration was not actually concerned
with the legality of such interrogation methods, but merely wanted to be
sure they could mount an “advice of counsel” defense if others sought to
hold administration officials legally accountable.
Even if one assumes that the Bush administration was seeking cover,
rather than advice, the identity-theory analysis still stands. Providing legal
cover is essentially performing an advocacy role in the guise of legal
advice. A document that appears to be neutral advice to the client may in
fact be written with an entirely different audience in mind. Knowing that
the client’s decision will ultimately face challenges, the attorney drafts a
document that purports to offer legal advice, but is not actually intended to
be relied upon by the client—instead, it is intended to persuade later
readers that the client reasonably relied on the attorney’s advice. In spite
of the fact that it appears to be an advisory document, it is actually an
advocacy document, much like an opening brief in a contested hearing.167
But while lawyers’ roles in advocacy may be different from their roles
as advisors, both roles contain one commonality: the need to accurately
gauge how outsiders will react to a given course of action. Just as an
advisor needs to predict such reactions in order to advise the client, so too
165
GELLMAN, supra note 136, at 191 (“[T]he opinion was commissioned specifically to give
formal blessing to methods the vice president and war cabinet had authorized in the White House
Situation Room.”). Alberto Gonzales’s later statements also suggest that he sees an immunityconferring aspect to the memos; in a recent interview with National Public Radio, he commented that
he did not expect to see torture prosecutions, stating: “These activities . . . they were authorized, they
were supported by legal opinions at the Department of Justice.” Kate Klonick, Gonzales: Holder
Won’t Prosecute Me, WASH. IND., Jan. 26, 2009, available at http://washingtonindependent.com/
27325/gonzales-holder-wont-prosecute-me.
166
See LUBAN, supra note 132, at 163 (“Torture is among the most fundamental affronts to
human dignity, and hardly anything lawyers might do assaults human dignity more drastically than
providing legal cover for torture and degradation.”).
167
This strategy has also been called a “quasi third-party advice,” as “lawyers purport to speak
disinterestedly in order to influence public conduct or attitudes for the benefit of private clients, and
which is given under conditions of nonaccountability and secrecy.” William H. Simon, The Market for
Bad Legal Advice: Academic Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1555, 1557 (2008).
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does an advocate need to predict how a decision maker is likely to rule.
Just as a litigator cannot know which arguments to emphasize at trial
without an idea of how a judge would likely view them, so too government
attorneys cannot provide good “legal cover” unless they can accurately
predict how persuasive their arguments will be when the challenged
conduct comes to light.
For advocates as well as advisors, partisan blindness can be equally
debilitating. As noted in Part III, the study participants who represented
plaintiffs or defendants tended to overestimate the strength of their case
and to underestimate the strength of their opponents’ case. Similarly, Yoo
also seems to have overestimated the persuasiveness of his arguments
supporting his rather extreme view of executive power. Yoo’s legal
analysis, which imported the Medicare statute’s characterization of
“medical emergency” to define the meaning of torture, failed to persuade
even those most sympathetic to the administration’s goals. In the end,
scholars have concluded that it was the values of a “lawyers’ craft” that
allowed Goldsmith to “identify the torture memos’ troubling [legal] errors”
and to put forward a more legally supportable analysis of interrogation
methods.168 As a result, it appears that Yoo’s more salient organizational
identity did not actually serve the Bush administration well; regardless of
whether his intent was to provide legal cover or legal advice, Yoo’s
counsel ultimately was of little help to his client.
V. SECURING INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE
The lessons learned from the case study of the interrogation memos,
combined with the empirical findings from identity theorists, suggest that
certain situations are likely to trigger predictable cognitive biases in legal
counsel.
First, attorneys with multiple role identities such as
employee/lawyer or policy maker/lawyer may find that the relative
salience of the employee and policy maker identities nudge them to offer
more deference to their organization. Second, attorneys with role identities
closely aligned to the client’s goals may be subject to the same cognitive
distortions suffered by the client, him or herself. Thus, clients may face a
conundrum in which the most dedicated attorneys are the worst positioned
to offer independent counsel.169
This section examines some mechanisms for minimizing cognitive
biases and enhancing independent counsel. Ultimately, it concludes no
single proposal can solve the problems of attorneys’ cognitive biases.
Some of the proposals offered—including greater accountability measures
168

Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1311, 1339 (2008).
See, e.g., Gunz & Gunz, supra note 74, at 875 (discussing how lawyers that have a greater
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and increased education—are unlikely to address the more deeply held
unconscious biases.170 Others proposals, such as requiring a more limited
role for lawyers, have detriments from the emotional distance of counsel
that outweigh the potential benefits of increased neutrality.171
Instead of an overarching solution, this Article suggests that progress
will occur only at the margins, and only if clients and attorneys are able to
recognize situations where neutrality is particularly at risk. The Article
uses insights from identity theory to identify two situations in which the
risk of biased judgment is particularly high. The first arises when the
attorney occupies another role within an organizational client, such as
manager or policy maker, at the same time as he or she is functioning as
counsel. The second arises when the client and attorney share common
goals that are closely linked to the attorney’s role identity—when, for
example, the attorney both closely identifies with a particular political
party and, at the same time, represents a client whose legal goals overlap
with the political party’s goals.172 This second situation is equivalent to the
broad definition of “cause lawyering” adopted by a number of scholars.173
A. Traditional Proposals
Numerous commentators have offered suggestions aimed at reducing
cognitive bias, enhancing independent judgment, or both. Some of the

170
See infra Part V.A.; see also Yin, supra note 152, at 502 (“[E]thical or professional conduct
restraints are not likely to be successful restraints on OLC lawyers, because those lawyers will either
not recognize or not agree as to the applicability of the ethical restraints. If anything, presidential
administrations that are most in need of having their policy preferences tempered by cautious legal
analysis are least likely to get such analysis if they are intent on hiring like-minded lawyers to fill the
political positions in OLC.”).
171
See, e.g., Bradley W. Wendel, Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror, DALHOUSIE L.J.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372744
(“Although the distinction between independence and partisanship is a superficially appealing one, it
does not stand up very well to analysis. . . . The winner of the presidential election justifiably believes
that the election conferred a mandate from voters to pursue a particular political agenda. The President
accordingly may select executive branch officials on basis of their fealty to this agenda—not just
because it is the President’s agenda, but because the content of the agenda has been set by a
democratically legitimate process.”).
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In this situation, the attorney is attempting to verify two identities: a professional identity in
representing the client and a cause-related identity as a political activist. The two roles are likely to
overlap and to share common meanings; for example, in a voting-rights case, success in the legal role
may equate to success in the political role, and both roles may include a common meaning of “mastery”
or “competence.” See, e.g., Peter J. Burke, Relationships Among Multiple Identities, in ADVANCES IN
IDENTITY THEORY AND RESEARCH 195, 201 (Peter J. Burke et al. eds., 2003).
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See, e.g., Southworth, supra note 160, at 85 (arguing that the term “cause lawyer” should not
be limited to those who primarily focus on empowering disadvantaged groups, but that it can be applied
equally to attorneys “engaged in advocacy that challenges prevailing distributions of power and
resources,” even if those lawyers are seeking to tip the balance of power in favor of conservative
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most commonly proposed solutions include debiasing education174 and
accountability mechanisms.175 Possible techniques of managing bias, if not
eliminating it, include deferring to clients for consent to the potential
conflict of interest,176 enforcing role separation and paternalistically
limiting the roles that an attorney may play in a particular matter.177
However, while these strategies may be appropriate in many situations, this
Article argues that they cannot effectively solve the problem of lawyers’
cognitive bias and therefore cannot alone solve the problems caused by a
lack of independent legal advice.
1. Creating Accountability Mechanisms
Some commentators suggest that making lawyers more accountable for
their clients’ behavior can motivate them to offer more reliable and
independent advice.178 This view tends to give credence to the “venality
hypothesis” described in Part I.179 It assumes that lawyers’ willingness to
rubber-stamp a client’s decision is rationally motivated by an effort to
please the client, and it supposes that creating countervailing incentives
will likewise motivate attorneys to offer more independent advice.180
While the venality hypothesis may explain some lapses in lawyer
behavior, it does not explain those cases in which lawyers seem to lack any
external incentive to give their clients self-serving advice. Clients may
sometimes pressure attorneys for favorable results, but client pressure is
not an element of every case—after all, clients are not always looking for
an attorney just to rubber-stamp desired actions. A rubber-stamp mentality
may indeed please some clients, at least in the short term, as such advice
may “ma[k]e it easier for them to do things they wanted to do—overstate
income on financial statements, underpay taxes, or torture people.”181 The
long-term consequences, however, are likely to more than offset such
174
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short-term satisfaction. When clients must re-state income, pay back taxes
(with penalties), and face unforeseen political and legal consequences for
their decisions, they are likely to be highly dissatisfied with their lawyers,
especially when they trusted that their lawyers’ advice would help them
avoid such consequences.182
And even if a client is looking for “legal cover” rather than
independent legal advice, the client still needs an attorney who can
accurately predict how such “cover” will be perceived by outsiders. If the
attorney’s judgment is so clouded that he or she cannot see how an outsider
will react to various legal strategies, then the attorney cannot hope to enact
a legal shield in support of the client’s actions. Whether the client is
seeking independent advice or legal cover, the client’s autonomy depends
on an attorney with unclouded judgment.
On one level, a client may want to hear that conduct she wants to
engage in is legal, since that makes it easier for the client to engage in the
desired activity. But the client may face long-term consequences for such
illegal conduct.
While a client can choose to act illegally, the
consequences of illegal conduct should not come as a surprise to the client.
Just as a patient can take action that is contrary to medical advice, a client
can take action even though it is against the law. But such a decision
should not be accompanied by his lawyer’s false assurance that the conduct
is legal.183
Thus, even though clients may be happy to be told that their preferred
course of action is legally permissible, they are likely to agree with Walter
Dellinger, the former head of the OLC, who concluded that “[y]ou won’t
be doing your job well, and you won’t be serving your client’s interest, if
you rubber-stamp everything the client wants to do.”184
In addition to overstating clients’ desire for self-serving advice, those
who support accountability mechanisms as a cure for lawyers’ failure to
exercise independent judgment also overstate the likelihood that attorneys
will properly calculate the incentives offered by such accountability
mechanisms. Lawyers who believe firmly (if erroneously) in the advice
they give their clients are unlikely to be affected by potential sanctions
aimed at curbing disingenuous advice. Research suggests that, at best,
there is no clear link between material incentives and the ability to
overcome cognitive biases:
[S]ome studies report a negative correlation between
182
Bruce A. Green, The Market for Bad Legal Scholarship: William H. Simon’s Experiment in
Professional Regulation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1605, 1619 (2008) (noting that the “client’s preference
would be to avoid questions about how it acted and, therefore, to avoid any reason to disclose the
lawyer’s advice”).
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financial incentives and the appearance of certain cognitive
biases; some studies report no correlation between incentives
and the likelihood of subjects’ showing a cognitive bias; and
some conclude that the effect of the incentive is a function of
its size, with cognitive performance improving as the size of
the monetary reward increases.185
When “‘intuition or habit provides an optimal answer and thinking harder
makes things worse,’” research suggests that material incentives are likely
to be counterproductive.186 As the next section explains, bias resulting
from partisan affiliation with a client resists eradication through additional
thought or education, and such attempts may even unwittingly reinforce
the bias.187 As a result, it is unlikely that external accountability
mechanisms or material incentives can overcome the judgment-clouding
effects of partisan bias.
2. Debiasing
Because cognitive biases render accountability mechanisms
ineffective, it would be helpful if there were a way to combat these biases.
While debiasing strategies can be effective in some cases, they are not
likely to be particularly effective at combating attorneys’ unconscious
partisan biases.
One of the primary debiasing mechanisms is to educate subjects about
the existence and effects of common cognitive biases.188 In theory, it is an
attractive option—it seems intuitive that, once informed of the prevalence
of cognitive bias, lawyers will be more able to avoid it. But the evidence
regarding effectiveness of such education is, at best, mixed. Some studies
have found that informing people about the existence of common biases
can help controvert the effects of those biases, especially when people are
asked to “question their own judgment by explicitly considering
counterarguments to their own thinking.”189 Other studies, however, have
suggested that education is actually counterproductive—that it reinforces
certain cognitive biases instead of combating them.190
185
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 114–15 (2002).
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Id. at 118 (quoting Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives
in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7,
34 (1999)).
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When attorneys’ cognitive biases are deep-seated and unconscious,
education is least likely to be effective. This bias blind spot may even
cause efforts at maintaining neutrality to backfire, increasing—rather than
decreasing—the original partisan commitment. In a follow-up to the
roommate study described in Part II,191 researchers attempted to educate
some of the participants about the “liking bias” and to ask others to make
an extra effort at fairness.192 The fairness instruction, given to some
subjects, stated that “[w]e are interested in determining which age groups
can be good mediators of conflict. A good mediator is someone who can
be fair, open-minded, and unbiased. Please try to be as fair as possible.”193
The bias-awareness instruction, given to other subjects, stated:
Previous research shows that when people learn about a
conflict, their responses are heavily influenced by how much
they like each of the people involved. We tend to accept the
actions of the person we like more than the actions of the
person we do not like as much. As you think about the
following conflict, please become aware of your natural likes
and dislikes, and try not to let them affect your responses.194
Neither instruction made students any fairer than those given a neutral
instruction. The fairness instruction, in fact, backfired and caused the
study participants to be significantly more committed to the “more
likeable” character.195 The bias-awareness instruction also had a slight,
though not statistically significant, correlation with answers in favor of the
more likeable character. Thus, the researchers concluded that while such
motivating instructions may make the participants put additional time and
effort into thinking about the conflict, they do not change the outcome.196
Participants believe they are “already being fair.”197 Thus, participants
simply put the extra time and effort into supporting the position they
already favored, not on rethinking the position with which they
disagreed.198
Because the partisan bias operates at such a deeply unconscious level,
and because people remain unaware of their own partisanship, it is difficult
can reinforce cognitive errors’ rather than cure them. Nor are these problems easily remedied by
information or education.” (quoting Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Ethics, Fairness and Efficiency in
Financial Markets, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1993, at 21, 23)).
191
See supra Part II.C.
192
Frantz, supra note 54, at 164.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
See id. at 165 (“Giving participants instructions to be fair made them significantly less fair, in
favor of the more likable character.”).
196
Id.
197
Id. at 166.
198
Id.
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to overcome. As one scholar has pointed out, “[b]ecause we perceive
ourselves to be objective, we have little reason to think critically about
whether our beliefs are, in fact, correct.”199 As a result, “our biased
theories, beliefs, and expectations, tend to persevere.”200
3. Treating the Potential for Bias as a Conflict of Interest
Another possibility is to view bias based on partisan affiliation as a
conflict of interest between lawyer and client and therefore to handle it
through disclosure and consent. Under this model, lawyers would inform
their clients that independence may be impaired if (1) the attorney is acting
as manager or policy maker in addition to the lawyer role; or (2) the
attorney’s representation is motivated in part by a role or group identity
shared with the client, such as political affiliation. Once the disclosure is
made, the clients could choose whether to consent to the risk that the
attorney’s judgment would be impaired by his or her other role obligations.
The consent-and-disclose approach fits in with the regulatory rules on
conflicts of interest. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, most
attorney conflicts of interest are “consentable” if the risks of representation
are fully disclosed to the client and the client gives informed consent to
them.201 A few conflicts, however, are deemed to be so disabling that the
lawyer cannot undertake the representation even with consent.202 Other
conflicts may present an especially high risk of attorney self-dealing; in
such a case, client consent may be allowed only if the lawyer advises the
client about the desirability of seeking independent counsel from another
attorney,203 or, in some cases, if the client actually obtains independent
counsel.204
Furthermore, the risks posed by partisan attorneys are similar to the
risks posed by conflicts of interest more generally.205 Scholars have argued
that the conflict of interest doctrine is essentially a structure for
determining “how to distinguish risks which are acceptable from those

199

Benforado & Hanson, supra note 59, at 518.
Id. at 519.
201
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–1.9 (2007); see also Nancy J. Moore,
Regulating Law Firm Conflicts in the 21st Century: Implications of the Globalization of Legal Services
and the Growth of the “Mega Firm,” 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 527 n.39 (2005) (“Under U.S.
rules, most conflicts are consentable.”).
202
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2007).
203
See id. at R. 1.8(a)(2) (2007) (referring to a lawyer’s business dealings with a client).
204
See id. at R. 1.8(h) (2007) (prohibiting a lawyer from contractually limiting malpractice
liability unless the client is independently represented in entering the contract).
205
See id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2007) (defining conflicts of interest broadly enough to include
cognitive limitations; providing that a conflict of interest exists when “there is a significant risk that a
lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will
be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests”).
200

2009]

JUDGMENT, IDENTITY AND INDEPENDENCE

37

206

which are unacceptable.”
By requiring that the risks be disclosed to the
client and allowing the client to choose whether to accept those risks, the
model “gives the client some choice about the questions of both magnitude
and justifiability of the risk she is willing to have her lawyer encounter.”207
But while a disclose-and-consent policy might look appealing in
theory, it is problematic in practice. Recent research suggests that such
disclosure may have “perverse effects” that lead to a less accurate
assessment of the risks than without such disclosure.208 In one study,
participants were asked to judge the value of a jar of coins.209 Participants
were randomly assigned to be either an estimator, who would provide the
official estimate of value, or an advisor, who would assist the estimator
with his or her evaluation. Estimators were paid according to the accuracy
of their evaluation, but the advisors were paid by how high the estimator’s
guess was—thus creating a clear financial incentive for the advisor to offer
an inflated assessment. In half of the cases the advisor disclosed this
conflict of interest, and in half of the cases the advisor did not.210
Under the disclose-and-consent model of conflicts of interest, one
would expect to see estimators discounting the advisor’s assessment when
the conflict was disclosed, thus compensating for the obvious conflict. In
fact, there was no statistically significant change in the estimators’
discounting practices.211 But what did change significantly was the
advisors’ assessments—when they disclosed the conflict, they suggested
much higher values to the estimators. Because the estimators failed to
discount the biased advice, their guesses were significantly higher when
the conflict was disclosed than when it was not disclosed.
The results of this study suggest that clients may not be well equipped
to discount a lawyer’s advice when a potential conflict of interest is
disclosed. It is not entirely clear why the advisors’ advice changed after
disclosure. The researchers offer two possible hypotheses. First, perhaps
the advisors expected the estimators to discount their advice once informed
of the potential for bias, and they wanted to counteract that effect.212 Or
perhaps the advisors felt “morally licensed” to pursue their own selfinterest once the disclosure was made, as the estimators then had the same
206
Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
823, 877 (1992).
207
Id. at 872.
208
See generally Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005).
209
Id. at 9.
210
Id. at 9–10.
211
Id. at 17.
212
Id. at 6–7; Daylian M. Cain et al., Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier: The Shortcomings of
Disclosure as a Solution to Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND
SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 104, 114–15 (Don A. Moore et al. eds.,
2005).
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information available to them as the advisors.
Both explanations are
plausible, and both suggest that disclosure is not a sufficient remedy for the
conflict of interest posed by biased advice. Unless the client is both
willing to discount the advice offered by a biased attorney and able to
accurately calculate the effect of that bias on the advice offered, disclosure
cannot remedy the effects of partisan bias.214
4. Regulating Role Separation
Given the difficulty of overcoming attorneys’ cognitive bias, some
commentators have recommended mechanisms to regulate role
separation—either by adopting rules that encourage lawyers’ independence
from clients or by prohibiting lawyers from playing multiple roles within
an organization. One commentator, for example, has suggested that law
schools socialize young lawyers into professional independence,215 that
judges use their appointment power to require attorneys to “represent
people outside their standard client base,”216 and that states apply a
“[n]arrow construction of the [conflict of interest] rules”217 to create market
incentives for lawyers to represent clients outside their typical range.
Others have suggested that lawyers should not play multiple roles
within an organization, either by participating in corporate management (in
the case of in-house counsel) or serving on the client’s board of directors
(in the case of outside counsel).218 Commentators posit that removing
lawyers from management roles allows the attorneys to focus exclusively
on providing legal advice and therefore removes much of the temptation to
shade their advice “in the direction of what the [top management team]
would like to hear, rather than what it should be hearing.”219
Enforcing such role separation may well reduce the role conflicts that
inhibit independent judgment. But such a separation entails two significant
disadvantages. The first disadvantage is one of knowledge: the more
213

Id. at 115–16.
Of course, even if disclosure and consent will not fully solve the problem of attorney bias, it is
still an important tool to protect clients’ autonomy and one that is generally required by the rules of
professional conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2007) (requiring
disclosure and consent); John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After Amchem
Products—Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients’ Money, 84 VA. L. REV.
1541, 1541 (1998) (noting that disclosure of conflicts protects clients’ autonomy interest).
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See Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 94
(2003) (“[L]aw teachers can support the service norm . . . . It makes a difference in the socialization of
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removed counsel is from the client, the less information the attorney is
likely to have about the subject matter of his or her legal advice. The
attorney will not be as well-informed, and therefore her advice simply
cannot be as responsive as it would be if, for example, the attorney served
on the top management team and possessed the full range of information
known to management.
The second disadvantage is one of motivation. Emotional proximity to
the client may lead to partisan bias, but emotional distance is not
necessarily good for the client either. An old joke illustrates the downside
of too much emotional distance between lawyer and client: the client, a
criminal defendant, has just lost at trial. “‘What happens now?’ the
horrified client asks.”220 The attorney replies, “‘Well, you go to jail—and I
go to lunch.’”221
For many lawyers—particularly those who represent clients from a
different social stratum than their own—the joke contains a grain of
truth.222 When there is a great deal of emotional distance between lawyer
and client, the lawyer is less likely to be troubled by a negative outcome
for the client, even when the client faces a potentially traumatic upheaval.
The distant relationship allows the lawyer to offer independent—even
disinterested—advice, but it does so at the cost of reducing the motivation
to push for a positive outcome. For example, a public defender, who
represents predominantly economically marginalized criminal defendants,
reported that frustration in dealing with his clients made him less likely to
offer strategic advice: “I can’t talk to these clients—it’s frustrating and
you never really do get through to them. So if they want their jury trial,
then OK, I’ll give it to them.”223 The lawyer made it clear that he felt more
comfortable with other lawyers and judges than he did with his clients: “I
prefer to deal with the people of the court—I’d rather talk and argue my
case with reasonable people in court, instead of arguing with my
clients.”224
Of course, these are extreme examples from a very specialized practice
area. Even with enforced role separation, it is unlikely that corporate and
governmental lawyers would become as disconnected from their clients as
this public defender was. But even a much-less-extreme version of this
disaffection can be disadvantageous to clients who expect their attorneys to
fully support their interests.
220
Paul Allen, Go! Cinema: Crime Doesn’t Pay for Ashley, COVENTRY EVENING TELEGRAPH
(England), Oct. 25, 2002, at 32.
221
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See Lynn Mather, What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065, 1074
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the key decisions).
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B. Risk Recognition and Identity Salience
Ideally, attorneys should offer their clients a balance of zealous
advocacy and independent advice. In practice, this balance is hard to
achieve. When attorneys are most motivated to zealously represent their
clients, a partisan bias may shade and distort their legal advice, rendering it
less than reliable.225 None of the traditional proposals offered to correct
this bias fully solve the problem; as discussed above, neither increased
accountability mechanisms nor education about cognitive bias are likely to
cure the bias blind spot. Nor is requiring disclosure of the potential for
bias a sufficient cure, as clients are likely to overestimate their attorneys’
ability to compensate for such risks. Finally, mandating role separation
may go too far in reducing attorneys’ motivation to provide diligent and
zealous representation.
But even in the absence of a single overarching solution, there are still
methods that attorneys and clients can use to combat the judgment failures
arising from partisan bias. This Article draws on social science research to
suggest strategies that both lawyers and clients can take to minimize the
risk of overly partisan legal advice. First, it offers recommendations for
identifying the situations most likely to trigger partisan bias. Second, once
such situations are identified, it offers suggestions for minimizing the risks
posed by lawyers’ partisan identification with clients.
1. Recognizing Situations Likely to Lead to Partisan Bias
Identity theory can help identify situations in which attorneys are at
high risk of having their judgment colored by partisan bias. Of course, one
of the challenges of cognitive biases is that individuals are unaware of
them. And the partisan bias is particularly susceptible to such a blind spot,
as it operates unconsciously even as individuals perceive themselves to be
objective.226 Thus, it is important to have a way of recognizing when
partisan bias is likely to sway attorneys’ judgment that does not require the
attorneys themselves to be aware of that bias. While identity theory cannot
pinpoint such situations precisely, it can provide insight into situations
particularly likely to facilitate the partisan bias.
225
Even attorneys working at large law firms with multiple clients are not immune from partisan
identification with their clients. As one commentator notes:
If there is a distance between large-firm lawyers and their corporate clientele over
general social and political questions, there is not much disparity between client
concerns and the lawyers’ agenda for change in the legal fields in which they
actually practice. . . . Given an unconstrained power to change the law, the majority
[of law-firm lawyers studied] would change the law to suit the interests of their
clients.
Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 525 (1985).
226
See supra text accompanying notes 191–200 (discussing a study in which participants are
instructed to be as fair as possible, yet they still have the same response).
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As discussed above, identity theory suggests that attorneys may be
particularly vulnerable to cognitive bias in two situations.227 The first
situation occurs when a separate professional role competes with the
traditional lawyer role. Thus, an in-house attorney who is asked to play
both a managerial role and a legal role, or a government attorney who
possesses both policy making and legal responsibilities may be particularly
vulnerable to partisan bias. In this situation, the risk is that the attorney’s
legal role will be so subordinated to the managerial or policy making role
(that is, the professional identity is significantly lower in the salience
hierarchy than the organizational identity) that the attorney’s judgment is
filtered through a managerial/policy lens.228
In this situation, the attorney is likely to overestimate the strength of
his or her employer’s position and to underestimate potential liability.
Identity theory suggests that this effect is part of the self-verification
process, as the attorney seeks to maintain his or her self-conceptions within
each of these roles. This self-verification process puts different pressures
on the professional identity than on the “manager” of “policy maker”
identity. Self-verification of the professional identity does not require any
particular outcome for the organization as a whole. As long as the attorney
is perceived to offer competent advice, the attorney’s internal role
standard—how she sees herself (for example, as a competent advisor)—
will match her reflected appraisal (she will perceive that others also view
her to be a competent advisor). But self-verification of a “manager” or
“policy maker” identity requires much more; only if the organization is
able to meet its goals will the manager/policy maker also be perceived as
successful. While a person may be perceived as a “good lawyer” if she
offers sound (though unwanted) advice, that person will not be perceived
as a “good manager” if her actions directly thwart the company’s goals.229
When a person filling both lawyer and manager roles is faced with a
situation where he or she cannot verify both identities (perhaps because
negative legal advice, while sound, would prohibit the company’s
management from taking desired actions), then the attorney is at risk for
developing cognitive biases in favor of management. The attorney would
be vulnerable to the “covert” self-verification strategies of selective
attention and interpretation, where “self-verifying information is given
227

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
229
See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing
the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 472 (2000) (reporting
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attention and processed, and information that is not self-confirming is
ignored,” and individuals “endors[e] feedback that fits self-views and
deny[ ] feedback that does not fit self-views.”230 By unconsciously
ignoring unfavorable information, the attorney is able to offer legal advice
favorable to management without violating his or her self-perception of
competent lawyering.
The second situation posing a high risk of cognitive bias occurs when a
role identity high in the lawyer’s salience hierarchy (such as Yoo’s identity
as a conservative activist) corresponds with the client’s goal. In Yoo’s
case, for example, his conservative political identity aligned closely with
the Bush administration’s goals—but it also left him subject to the same
blind spots, unable to see how others would view his legal opinions as
overreaching and unsupported.
This situation of alignment between lawyer identity and client goal
may be functionally the same as “cause lawyering,” which is often defined
by a “deep identification with and commitment to” a cause, such that the
lawyer specifically seeks out clients whose legal needs align with that
cause.231 Attorneys who view themselves as “cause lawyers” and share
common goals with their clients may similarly share blind spots with
Again, identity theory suggests that the self-verification
them.232
mechanism comes into play. The cause lawyer’s more salient identity is,
for example, “conservative activist,” “civil liberties activist,” or “poverty
lawyer.” Self-verification of such an identity requires success in moving
the cause forward. Just as the lawyer/manager had an unconscious
incentive to view the facts in favor of corporate management, the cause
lawyer has an unconscious incentive to view the facts in the light most
favorable to the cause. To the extent that the client shares the same
commitment to the cause, the lawyer’s cognitive biases are likely to mirror
the client’s, as seemed to happen with Yoo. These biases render the
lawyer unable to either offer neutral advice or to accurately predict how
decision makers will respond to various avenues of advocacy.
230

Stets & Cast, supra note 101, at 522.
See McMunigal, supra note 160, at 783 (describing Sarah Weddington, the lawyer who won
Roe v. Wade and remained committed to the causes of women’s rights and reproductive choice); see
also Southworth, supra note 160, at 85 (arguing that the term “cause lawyer” should not be limited to
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attorneys “engaged in advocacy that challenges prevailing distributions of power and resources,” even
if those lawyers seek to tip the balance of power in favor of conservative causes).
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See Patrick J. Bumatay, Causes, Commitments, and Counsels: A Study of Political and
Professional Obligations Among Bush Administration Lawyers, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 8–9 (“[A] distinct
quality of cause lawyering is the elevation of political or moral commitments above the client . . . .
Cause lawyers still engage in client service, but, significantly, they view that work as a ‘means to their
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may advance their own cause.” (quoting STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO
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If the client is less committed to the cause than the lawyer, then the
lawyer may simply favor the cause over the client’s individualized
interests. For example, in Roe v. Wade, attorney Sarah Weddington
viewed the case as “one facet of a collective effort to expand women’s
reproductive rights.”233 Her client, however, was primarily “interested in
terminating the pregnancy that was the source of her current dilemma,” and
was “neither politically aware nor committed.”234 At the outset of the case,
Weddington made a strategic choice not to pursue a narrow argument that
the Texas abortion statute should have a rape exception, but chose instead
to focus on the broader issue of the statute’s constitutionality as a whole. It
was not clear, at the time she made the decision, which strategy would be
more likely to succeed for her client.235
Assuming Weddington even considered an argument based on a rape
exception, she may have been predisposed to underestimate its likelihood
of success; prevailing on that exception would not help the larger cause.
Critics of cause lawyering suggest that even in the absence of cognitive
bias, partisan affiliation with a cause may push a lawyer to seek results that
do not serve the client’s individual legal needs.236 When the lawyer’s
affiliation with the cause also prompts partisan bias, this effect is
magnified. In that case, the lawyer’s unconscious bias influences him or
her to view the legal situation in the light most favorable to the cause, and
the lawyer may therefore overlook non-cause-related strategies that would
benefit the individual client. Not only does the lawyer push for a positive
cause-related outcome, but she may not even recognize the strengths of
alternative legal strategies.
2. The Situational Effect on Identity Salience
The prior subsection argued that identity theory can help identify
particular situations in which attorneys are likely to be particularly
susceptible to partisan bias, and it distinguished two particular high-risk
situations: (1) those in which the attorney plays more than one professional
role in an organization; and (2) those in which the attorney is motivated by
a deep commitment to, and identification with, a social cause beyond the
case itself. In both situations, the attorney’s legal judgment is affected
when the “professional” identity is subordinate to the competing identity—
a “manager,” “policy maker,” or “employee” identity in the first instance,
and a cause-related role identity such as “conservative activist” in the
233
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second instance. This Article has argued that when one of these competing
identities is more salient than the professional identity, the attorney is more
likely to unconsciously engage in selective attention, selective perception,
and related biases in an effort to verify that identity. By contrast, when the
professional identity is more salient, the attorney is more likely to offer
neutral advice and better able to predict how outside decision makers will
evaluate a legal question. In the absence of an overarching solution to
eliminate the larger problem of potential bias and conflict of interest, the
question then becomes whether there are nevertheless steps that can be
taken at the margin to facilitate a more salient professional identity. This
Article argues that there are indeed such steps.
In recent years, both social scientists and legal scholars have begun to
focus on the power of situational influences, finding that “seemingly small
features of social situations can have massive effects on people’s behavior”
across a variety of contexts.237 There is no reason that attorney judgment
should be different. This Article therefore posits a model of situational
influence—that situations can act in conjunction with lawyers’ identity
structures to “transform the ease or difficulty of certain courses of
action.”238 Although an individual lawyer’s identity structure may cause
him or her to be particularly susceptible to particular cognitive biases in the
scenarios identified above, small changes in situation can increase the
attorney’s reliance on his or her professional identity, rather than an
organizational or cause-related identity, when a client needs more neutral
legal advice.
First, research suggests that attorneys can take steps to raise the
salience of the professional identity, increasing the probability that the
professional identity will be activated in a particular situation. Both the
time spent in the role and the connections maintained in that role are
correlated with the salience of the role identity.239 So an attorney who
spends more time focused on providing legal advice (rather than
management of policy making) is likely to have a more salient professional
identity. Similarly, if the attorney connects to other individuals who share
that identity, it will also be more salient—so, for example, a reproductiverights attorney who wants to avoid falling prey to unconscious bias could
spend time in a group based on participants’ shared profession (for
example, a local bar association group) rather than solely spending time in
groups with a shared social cause. By increasing the time spent connecting
with other people over more general professional concerns, the attorney
would likely find that her professional identity rises in salience as
237
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 252 (2008).
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240

compared to her cause identity.
The attorney would remain no less
committed to the cause of reproductive rights, but the increased salience of
her professional identity would make it more accessible when she is asked
to make a legal judgment.
Even a modest increase in the salience of the attorney’s professional
identity may have a significant impact on the attorney’s legal judgment in
practice. Recent research has looked at the impact of the strength and
salience of both a “worker” identity and “moral” identity on the decision to
cheat in a laboratory study.241 The researchers found that each of these
identities influenced participants’ propensity to cheat in opposite
directions—for every unit increase in the worker identity, odds of cheating
increased ninety-six percent, but for every unit increase in the moral
identity, the odds of cheating decreased by sixty percent.242 A unit change
in the worker identity had a greater impact on the outcome than did a unit
change in the moral identity. Thus, the researchers concluded that both
identities were operative in the situation, but that the worker identity was
more salient than the moral identity.243
It seems likely that the same effect may occur when lawyers’
competing identities are both activated—both the organizational identity
and the professional identity may be activated when in-house counsel is
asked for legal advice, for example. When the attorney’s advice is
unconsciously biased in favor of the organization, then the attorney’s
organizational identity ends up influencing the advice more than his or her
professional identity. If so, then increasing the salience of the professional
identity should also increase its ultimate influence on the attorney’s
judgment and presumably decrease the incidence of biased advice.
As noted above, the strategies of increasing time and commitment to a
professional identity increase the identity’s overall salience within the
attorney’s hierarchy of identities. But there are also strategies that can
further increase salience situationally; research suggests that “the identity
hierarchy gets slightly re-ordered within a situation as the situation triggers
the salience of some identities over others.”244 This research suggests that
an identity can be “primed” through reflection to achieve increased
240
Ideally, such activities would include interaction with attorneys who possess different
perspectives, and at a minimum, it should include interaction with attorneys outside the particular legal
team. Interaction solely with co-workers is much less likely to promote critical thinking. See Andrew
M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 461 (2007) (“Unanimity also encourages conformity, and unanimity is common
among lawyers who are working together on the same legal matter.”).
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242
Id. at 32.
243
Id.
244
Id. at 32–33.

46

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1

salience in a given situation, making it more likely that the identity will be
activated in a given situation.245 For example, writing and describing the
words “caring,” “compassionate,” “kind,” and related terms worked to
prime a moral identity.246 Study participants in the primed condition were
more likely to report negative emotions after reading a news story about
the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners and were less likely to express moral
disengagement.247
There are a number of ways that an attorney could prime a professional
identity. Again, interacting with others in a professional capacity may
have such an effect—sharing professional expectations and discussing the
legal ramifications of a particular issue may increase its salience relative to
an organizational or cause-related identity.248 Even if privilege concerns or
other issues precluded discussing the case with others, the attorney could
still individually reflect on issues of independence and neutrality.
One type of personal reflection, which David Luban has termed
“Socratic Skepticism,” may be especially helpful at combating the
cognitive biases caused by the subordination of a lawyer’s professional
identity. Luban describes the skepticism as taking “a stance of perpetual
doubt toward one’s own pretensions as well as the pretensions of others . . .
by trying to make a habit of doubting one’s own righteousness, of
questioning one’s own moral beliefs, of scrutinizing one’s own
behavior.”249 Attorneys with strong organizational or cause-related
identities are especially likely to benefit from taking a skeptical approach
to their own legal advice, and to focus their skepticism particularly on
issues of independence and neutrality. The very process of reflecting on
these values may act to prime the attorney’s professional identity and thus
increase its salience in the decision making process.250
Finally, strategies to increase the situational salience of an attorney’s
245
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professional identity may incorporate elements of some of the traditional
proposals discussed above, such as accountability mechanisms, education,
disclosure and consent, or role separation. While none of the proposals
appears to fully solve the problem of attorney bias, elements of those
proposals may nevertheless be valuable for activating an attorney’s
professional identity, especially to the extent that they encourage the
attorney to focus on the particular aspects of independence and neutrality
that may be lacking when the attorney’s organization or cause-related
identity is more salient. A legal team might therefore adopt an
accountability device of evaluating attorneys specifically on measures of
neutrality and independence—performed either by a managing attorney or
through peer evaluations. The very mention of these factors in the
evaluation may act to prime the attorney’s professional identity.
VI. CONCLUSION
When onlookers ask, “Where were the lawyers?” after a high-profile
corporate or governmental scandal in which there were “red flags waving
all over the place,”251 the answer may be that the lawyers’ partisan
affiliation with their client blinded them to those flags. Relying on an
identity-theory explanation of lawyer behavior, this Article argues that
attorneys may be particularly susceptible to such a partisan bias in two
situations: first, where the lawyer performs a policy making or managerial
role in the client’s organization in addition to providing legal services, and
second, where the attorney is motivated by a deep commitment to, and
identification with, a social cause beyond the case itself. In both of these
cases, the lawyer’s professional identity is at risk of being subordinated to
an organizational or cause-related identity, and in such a case, the lawyer’s
judgment is less likely to be neutral or independent.
These situations present a conundrum for the client: the very factors
that motivate the attorney to provide zealous, committed representation
also inhibit the attorney’s ability to offer unbiased, independent advice.
Because traditional proposals for eliminating or managing bias appear
unlikely to provide a comprehensive solution to the cognitive biases that
arise from attorneys’ partisan affiliation with clients, this Article
recommends a more modest approach to increase the salience of lawyers’
professional identities and to minimize the biases that result from
subordination of that identity. Increasing the time spent participating in
professional activities and increasing the number of connections to others
with a similar professional identity may help to increase the salience of that
identity. Similarly, reflecting on the need for neutrality and independence
may also activate the lawyer’s professional identity in a given situation.
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While these are small changes and not overarching solutions, even a small
change in identity salience can influence the attorney’s legal judgment at
the margin in close calls.

